Ukraine's Cyber Forces bill: who commands the hackers?

Ukraine's Cyber Forces bill: who commands the hackers?. Ukraine encouraged volunteer hackers to join its fight against Russia. Four years on, parliament is weighing a military Cyber Force with a civilian reserve. The open question is who gives the orders for cyber operations, who answers for them, and where the volunteers who prefer independence fit. In March 2025 Ukraine's military intelligence chief presented members of the civilian hacker group Laska with the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, third class. Military intelligence said it was the first time in the service's history that civilian cyber specialists had received state awards at that level. The Record reported that officials acknowledge working with hacktivists but deny controlling them or giving them tasks. A bill before parliament would give part of that work a formal home, but the volunteers are not one group. The IT Army, independent networks and the civilian experts a reserve would recruit are different populations, and reporting on the bill addresses only some of them. Official praise left the volunteers' legal status unresolved When the full scale invasion began, Ukraine's digital defenders included a volunteer IT Army running denial of service attacks on Russian sites, smaller groups that leaked data, and civilians whose work shaded into intelligence gathering. The Record reported in December 2022 that officials praised the hacktivists while distancing themselves from specific attacks. Natalia Tkachuk, head of the information security and cybersecurity service, proposed decriminalising hacktivism, while officials disagreed about whether the volunteers resembled civilians who joined territorial defence. A May 2023 analysis for the West Point Lieber Institute concluded that IT Army members were civilians rather than combatants. They could lose protection from attack while directly taking part in hostilities and could be detained without prisoner of war status. The International Committee of the Red Cross says such participation is not in itself a war crime, although civilians can be prosecuted under domestic law. The arrangement gave Ukraine useful capabilities without formally taking responsibility for every operation, and left volunteers with legal risks that official praise did little to resolve. By 2025 The Record was reporting cyber officials saying the volunteers' status was unlikely to change soon. The bill would put a developing force on a legal footing Formation had already begun before the bill passed first reading. On 6 October 2025 the Armed Forces said that the process of forming the Cyber Forces as a separate branch had begun under a 2021 presidential decree and defence directives. DOU reported in February 2026, citing the National Security and Defence Council, that the force was practically operating, with a command effectively formed. The bill would give that structure a statutory basis and define its relationship with civilian specialists. Parliament approved bill 12349 at first reading on 9 October 2025, with 255 MPs in favour; the Rada's bill record lists it as awaiting second reading. The Record described a Cyber Force combining offensive and defensive capability under one command reporting to Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, with a reserve of civilian technical experts. On 16 January 2026 the National Security and Defence Council convened the General Staff, the defence ministry, military intelligence and MPs to align positions. ITC.ua reports a reserve open to specialists who pass selection and can work remotely where authorised, including foreigners and stateless people, with the Cyber Forces able to bring in IT companies and volunteer organisations. Published accounts disagree over whether contracted reservists would become servicemembers. Shmyhal said they would not, while DOU reported that they would gain servicemember status. Whatever the final arrangement, calling someone a reservist does not by itself settle their combatant status under international law, which depends on how a force is organised. Combatant status also does not remove liability for war crimes. Who commands cyber operations is a live dispute Ukraine already has several bodies working in this space, among them military intelligence, military signals and cybersecurity units, and the SBU, which says it carries out systematic proactive operations in adversary cyberspace. Oleksandr Fediyenko, the bill's co-author, told Deutsche Welle Ukraine, as quoted by The Record, that attackers and defenders need different skills and legal frameworks. He sees the Cyber Forces focused on offence, with the existing Signals and Cybersecurity Troops defending Ukraine's networks. That is a dispute about dividing military responsibility, and it differs from opposing the Cyber Forces. The bill is also politically contested. On 10 March Dev.ua reported Fediyenko saying that Mariana Bezuhla was blocking a vote with about 1,000 amendments, a claim the article did not test with her. On 30 April Dev.ua reported her objections: that the bill mainly builds an inflated staff under Syrskyi and that cyber specialists could be sent to the infantry if they refused an order. Some hacktivists want the law. In March, Dev.ua quoted Mykyta Knysh of the HackYourMom channel saying the cyber forces exist but the law does not, and Sean Townsend urging lawmakers to pass the bill as it stands. A volunteer can favour a formal cyber force without wanting to join it. A state can employ hackers, direct their targets and answer for the results without bringing every participant into its armed forces. Ukraine appears to be giving a developing structure a defined chain of command and a route for civilian specialists. The strongest counter-reading is that structure narrows the room for independence. As the state selects and contracts civilian specialists and answers for operations, groups that stay outside may find it harder to remain unremarked. The reporting available shows no sign of that so far, and prominent hacktivists are asking for the law. Ukraine is not starting its military cyber capability from scratch. It is trying to give a developing force a clearer legal basis. The remaining question is how civilian specialists can work with it without treating every volunteer group as part of the same organisation. Sources: The Record (Daryna Antoniuk; 2 December 2022, 5 March 2025, 13 October 2025); Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine (4 March 2025); Armed Forces of Ukraine (6 October 2025); International Committee of the Red Cross; West Point Lieber Institute (William Casey Biggerstaff, May 2023); DOU (17 February 2026); Dev.ua (10 March 2026, 30 April 2026); National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (16 January 2026); Security Service of Ukraine (26 January 2026); ITC.ua (16 June 2026); Verkhovna Rada bill record, bill 12349, and transcript of the 9 October 2025 sitting; Militarnyi.